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SOME NOTES ON ETHICAL INTUITIONISM 
by William H. Davis 
Nonnaturalism in ethics has two major variants, the "rational insight" 
version and the "intuition" or "moral sense" version. These versions have in 
common the belief that we "just know" or ' just  see" basic moral facts. The 
rational insight version claims that we know moral facts immediately, intui- 
tively, and in the same way that we supposedly know the basic laws of logic 
or in the same way that we achieve any fundamental intellectual insight. We 
just see some things to be true, both logically and morally. In addition, the 
rational insight version tends to claim that moral insight is not merely like 
insight into logical truths, but that it is actually a species of the same thing. 
In other words, moral insight in an insight of our rational nature. 
The other version of nonnaturalism, the intuitionist theory, does not urge 
that the moral and the logical faculties have a common root, but does argue 
that the moral sense is an intuitive faculty for bringing us moral insight in the 
same way that the logical faculty is supposed to bring us insight into the laws 
of logic or the rules of inference. Actually, the classical expositions of nonnatu- 
ralism do not always clearly distinguish between these two versions, and, as 
Richard Brandt observes, "it is possible to combine the two answers in various 
ways."' Whether or to what extent the roots of our moral consciousness may 
be entangled in the roots of our reasoning nature is an interesting question, but 
it is not crucial to our purposes here. 
In the notes which follow I would like to present some considerations in 
favor of the intuitionist position, both by answering certain criticisms and, in 
the latter part of the discussron, by adducing some positive suggestions. W. H. 
Hudson's book, Ethical Intuitionistn, will serve for the purpose of bringing 
to light some common objections to  intuition as a way of knowing. His book 
is largely concerned with the rational insight version of nonnaturalism, but his 
objections to intuition as a way of knowing apply equalIy to both the rational 
insight and the moral sense positions. 
T o  begin with, we may briefly indicate some of the standard arguments in 
favor of the moral sense theory: 
Mr. D a v ~ s  15 Assaclate Professor of Ph1lo5ophy at Auburn Un~vers~ty. 
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(1) Feelings of obligation, guilt, and injustice are unique and cannot be 
reduced to feelings of fear or feelings of social pressure o r  of habit. 
(2) The language suggests the fact of a moral sensitivity in such phrases as 
"sense of guilt," "feeling of obligation," and, most importantly, in the 
word "conscience." 
(3) Nearly all men of all ages and cultures have been found to share the 
same basic moral code-a fact which is at the least compatible with the 
intuitionist hypothesis and at the most supportive of it.3 
(4) Any ethical theory, no matter how elegant, must in the end be tested 
against our feelings. We would never accept any ethical theory which 
was too far out of line with what we feel to be right and wrong, thus 
showing that feeling is the final arbiter of all our theories. 
(5) The fact that the moral sense can be sharpened and dulled makes 
intuitionism more plausible, both by increasing the analogy with our 
other senses and by explaining such differences of moral judgment as do  
exist. 
Other and more subtle arguments in favor of this doctrine can no doubt be 
adduced. They may be found in the classic expositions of in tu i t ion i~m.~  
Let us first consider Professor Hudson's objections to intuition as a way of 
knowing. Hudson asks if it makes sense at all to speak of knowing something 
by intuition. Perhaps, he says, we can thus "feel sure" of something, but can 
we really know it? He says: 
I am ent~tled to say 'I know X' ~f (I)  X IS true I cannot know that London ts the cap~tal 
of Scotland (11) I believe X. It does not make sense to say 'I know London IS the cap~tal 
of England but I do not belleve ~t ' (111) I have a sattsfactory answer to the quectton, 'How 
do you know X?,' glvtng me what Professor A J Ayer calls 'the r~ght  to be sure ' (P 57) 
Hudson believes that alleged intuitive knowledge does not meet these crite- 
ria for saying we know something. 
Let us consider each of these points in turn. First, Hudson says, I am entitled 
to say "I know X" if X is true. This is a point we need not argue here at length, 
except to say that it seems to place impossible demands upon US. Strictly 
speaking, we know scarcely anything to be true beyond all conceivabIe doubts. 
If we take Hudson's criterion here very rigorously, and if we start down the 
road on which he is placing us, we will certainly end up in old-fashioned 
Humean skepticism. A s  the extensive literature on this topic shows, much 
depends on how we ordinarily use the word "know" and on what we wish o r  
decide to mean by it in philosophical discourse. This is a subject that can be 
debated at length. But in any case, an intuitionist is entitled to say that if we 
are going to rule out intuitive knowledge on the ground that it is sometimes 
mistaken, we must also be prepared to rule out all other forms of knowledge, 
including deliverances of sense, on the same ground. 
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Hudson's second criterion for proper use of the word "know" is that I 
believe what I claim to know. This point seems trivial, if unexceptionable. 
Hudson's third criterion is that "I have a satisfactory answer to the question, 
'How do you know X?,' giving me what Professor A. J. Ayer calls 'the right 
to be sure.' " 
This third criterion as suggested by Ayer is the important one, but it is 
subject to serious objections. Ayer believes we must be able to give good 
reasons or evidences for believing as we do. But philosophers differ notoriously 
over what they count as  good reasons, and even over what they count as 
reasons. Actually, we are not in a position to give reasons for believing many 
fundamental things-or, rather, we are not in a position to give reasons which 
will convince everyone equally, especially philosophers of Mr. Ayer's persua- 
sion. How do we know there is an outside world? How do we know there are 
other minds? How do we know that reason is reliable? How do  we know the 
future will be like the past? And, finally, how do  we know we ought not to 
torture babies? When philosophers attempt to find cogent reasons for accepting 
all these common-sense notions they are led into a jungle of gruesome compli- 
cations. In reality our "reason" for accepting all these ideas may be only that 
they are irresistible and overwhelmingly naturaI. About such fundamental 
things, "nature overcomes all doubts," as Hume acutely observed. But, while 
Mr. Ayer would probably reject naturalness as a criterion for acceptance of 
first principles, we may seriously doubt that he could adduce reasons for our 
belief in basic propositions that would satisfy a Humean skeptic. 
But Hudson's real point here is that whatever may be found to give us the 
"right" to believe things, at least we know that having a strong intuit~ve 
conviction of something does not give us the "right" to believe it. Why? 
Because having a strong intuitive conviction is nothing more than strongly 
believing something, or simply feeling sure of something. According to 
Hudson, we cannot let "feeling sure" of something count as good grounds 
for believing it. This would open the door to complete subjectivism and 
fanaticism. 
But the fanatic does not necessarily have a strong intuitive conviction of 
what he believes. He may merely be employing what Peirce calk the method 
of tenacity. Or  he may be clutching at a belief which promises to promote his 
interests. An intuitive conviction may be a very different thing from a strongly 
held belief. One could even have a strong intuition and refuse to believe it. 
Further, an intuitive conviction could very well constitute good grounds for 
a strongly held belief. Consider a somewhat extreme case. Imagine a man who 
can "intuit" with marvelous accuracy the numbers to be thrown on a pair of 
dice. He ''just sees" the number that is coming up next. Suppose he averages 
only one incorrect call out of a thousand. A man with such intuitions, and with 
such a record of successful calls, would have every right to count a strong 
intuition as a satisfactory ground for belief. Or if we want to say the ground 
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for belief 1s the record of successful calls and not the intuition perse, we would 
surely be entitled to transfer our confidence to the faculty which gave us our 
successful calls. With such a record of successful calls, each one preceded by 
a strong intuitive conviction, a normal man would surely begin to place high 
confidence In his intuitions. 
Hudson further argues that we cannot claim to know the deliverance of an 
intuition because "intuition is indistinguishable in cases where it is ultimately 
shown to have been mistaken from those in which it is not" (p. 57). Again, 
this is no substantial objection. As an objection it applies to all other of our 
alleged ways of knowing. Illusions of sense or of reason as we are under them 
are also indistinguishable from accurate insights or sense experiences. Only 
when they are "ultimately shown to have been mistaken" do we reject them. 
Hudson further objects that we do  not in fact accept intuitive conviction as 
a proper answer to the question of how a man knows because, "if we did, we 
should persist in our claim to know by intuition, whatever contrary evidence 
came to light. But only mad men do that" (p. 58). But there is no difficulty 
in supposing a man to have a strong intuition which turns out to have been 
illusory. The  man merely admits he was under a false sense of conviction. 
Precisely the same applies to illusions of sense. A man may see something, may 
say he knows he sees it, and later discover that he was not seeing what he 
thought he saw at all. One writer gives an apt comparison: "We do not 
conclude that memory is an infallible faculty [simply] because it is bad English 
to say we remembered something which did not happen."' Likewise we need 
not regard intuitive knowledge as infallible merely because of the difficulty of 
saying we intuited something that was not so. "It seems only reasonable to 
regard intu~tion as a developing capacity and therefore capable of error. . . ."' 
If a man could call the throw of dice based upon an intuitive conviction, the 
fact of having one wrong call in a thousand would not destroy his confidence 
in the general trustworthiness of his intuitions. 
More serious, however, is the objection that, unlike our example of a man 
calllng the roll of dice where verification is easy, in ethics there would never 
be a way of determining whether our intuitions are "ultimately mistaken" o r  
not. For this, some tests beyond the mere presence of the intuition would be 
needed. Let us consider in a little more detail the problem of testing. 
Intuitionists often compare the moral sense with our other senses, such as 
that of sight. But Hudson argues that whereas with sight there are agreed tests 
for deciding whether a man's vision is defective, there are no such agreed tests 
for moral blindness. Hudson thinks that the intuitionist, when he says a man 
is morally blind, is uttering nothing more than a "vacuous tautology," namely, 
that the man does not see because he does not see. Without agreed-upon tests, 
what more can he mean? "If Smith failed every test for defective eyesight 
known to specialists, yet still did not see the tree on the lawn, it would tell us 
nothing to say that he d ~ d  not see it because his eyesight was defective" (p. 59). 
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But it might be true, even if it tells us "nothing." That is, we may believe his 
eyesight is defective even if we do not know exactly how his sight is defective. 
Of course, it may also tell us that our tests for defective vision are themselves 
lacking. 
Hudson is serious when he speaks of our agreed-upon tests for defective 
vision and the lack of such tests in the case of alleged moral vision. And of 
course the idea of tests and verification procedures is important in modern 
empirical philosophy, and probably accounts in a large measure for the demise 
of intuitiontsm. As Richard Brandt says, "The most vulnerable point of non- 
naturalist doctrine . . . is the epistemology, the theory of how we know or are 
justified in believing ethical statements." This author further speaks of "the 
profusion of nonnaturalist difficulties on this   core."^ 
The whole area of verification and its relation to meaning and knowledge 
is a tangled and controversial field. So controversial and unsettled is it that 
intuitionists need not panic at the mention of the word "verification." In the 
first place (to use Hudson's example of vision), no one has ever verified that 
any person other than the subject actually sees anything at all, as contrasted 
with reacting to light waves in the way a highly complex robot might. In the 
second place, all of our tests for defective vision rely either upon agreement 
with a consensus o r  upon a cross-checking with our other senses (sometimes 
mediated by instruments). But the same sorts of tests are possible with ethical 
(and other sorts of) intuitions. An  intuitionist need not hold that we know the 
good by intuition alone any more than a sighted man must rest all his confi- 
dence upon his vision. Our detection and classification of a "psychopath" 
involves his deviation from a broad consensus. More importantly, ethtcal 
intuitions can be cross-checked with our other faculties. They can be checked 
for consistency among themselves by examining them in the light of reason. 
They can be examined to see whether they could consistently be put into 
practice, which Kant suggests is the heart of the matter. They can be checked 
as to whether they are in accord with our sympathetic nature. And since most 
ethical insights can be subsumed under a very few heads, perhaps even under 
one head, new insights can be checked for whether o r  not they conveniently 
fit under previously established categories. And if those categories involve 
natural properties, as is the case with several ethical theories, an ethical intui- 
tion can be checked against a scientific determination of human nature. (As 
I shall explain below, the good need not be defined by the intuitive faculty; 
the faculty may only point toward it.) A. C. Ewing speaks of checking intui- 
tions by comparison of one case with another, by comparing the present 
intuition with our relevant past experience, by noting what would be implied 
for conduct if the prescription of the intuition were made a general rule, by 
noting consequences of proposed policies, and by checking the present intui- 
tion for coherence with our ocher generally accepted ethical criteria. "We must 
not suppose that, because an intuition is not proved true by reasoning, there- 
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fore it cannot be supported by reasoning. The use of t eas  does not imply that 
the belief tested is to be based upon the tests alone, but the tests and the original 
intuition tested confirm each other."' All of this would be comparable to 
cross-checking our vision with our sense of touch, or checking the consistency 
of our visual appearances. 
The idea of cross-checking raises a very important and neglected point. In 
most discussions of intuitionism, both for and against, it is more or less 
assumed that the intuition, if it exists, is giving us our sole source of knowledge 
of the good (or the obligatory". In Richard Brandt's book on ethics he 
discusses intuitionism under the heading of nonnaturalism. Bur it is misleading 
to imply that intuitionism must be a form of nonnaturalism. It is quite possible 
that the good is some natural property (such as that which meets human 
needs), and, at the same time, that we have an intuitive recognition of those 
acts and situations which are possessed of those natural properties. This is a 
most important distinction, and the failure to note it vitiates many critiques 
of intuitionism. 
If we were to follow philosophers such as C. I. Lewis, Brand Blanshard, and 
Richard Taylor in holding (roughly) that the good is that which meets human 
needs,'' we would have a naturalistic system generally amenable to scientific 
investigation. Just as we can investigate what amoebae o r  rats need for the 
fulfillment of their physical and psychological natures, we are not completely 
in the dark as to the kinds of surroundings and the kinds of scts that are 
conducive to  human fulfillment. T o  define the good in this way is not entirely 
implausible nor out of harmony with ordinary usage. But such a system of 
ethics by no means precludes the existence of an intuitive recognition of the 
kinds of deeds and situations which are good by that definition. 
The sense of taste is a highly reliable (but not perfect) guide to the foods that 
are nutritious (apart from artificial flavoring, etc.)." And yet foods are not 
nutritious because they taste good, but rather because they meet the needs of 
the body, promoting its growth, health, and longevity. Nutrition is defined in 
this perfectly natural way. I t  is not defined by the sense of taste. But taste is 
an innate faculty pointing us in the direction of nutritious foods. Now in the 
same way that taste points us in the direction of nutritious foods, the moral 
sense may likewise be an innate facuIty pointing us toward certain kinds of 
conduct, and these kinds of conduct may very well be subject to a description 
independent of the fact that they register in a peculiar manner upon our moral 
sensitivity. 
Cross-checking implies that the moral sense can be checked against non- 
moral considerations for confirmatory or disconfirmatory indications. This 
would be a problem if we drew a sharp line between human faculties, or 
perhaps if we were deontologists or pure nonnaruralists in ethics. But if we 
believe that no sharp lines can necessarily be drawn between our different 
faculties, especially our psychological faculties, or if we believe that the moral 
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intuition is pointing us toward that which is reasonable, or Iife and species 
enhancing, or  in accordance with our sympathetic nature, o r  fulfilling and 
satisfying to all elements of human nature, or  in harmony with God's will, or  
in the interest of a viable society, or  all of these, we are in a much better 
position to work out a satisfactory ethical theory. If our duty coincides with 
the many and varied elements of our nature, we are in a very fortunate 
position. If, on the other hand, duty can in no way be found to correspond to 
our nature (taken in the widest possible sense), then no cross-checking of the 
moral sense would be possible-duty might be inconsistent, harmful, capri- 
cious, or whatever. If the ethical intuition were found to cut against the grain 
of all other elements of our nature, we would be much in doubt about the 
existence or  reliability of such an alleged intuition. And the critics have ex- 
pressed doubts about intuitive ethical knowledge partly because some theorists 
have placed all the burden for our ethical knowledge on this faculty and have 
not permitted it to be checked o r  tested by any means. Considering the univer- 
sality and similarity of the moral sense, one could perhaps even make a case 
for such an exclusive view of the moral intuition. But it is much easier to make 
a case for it if we can see our way clear to find checks for it in our other 
faculties, as I believe we can. 
All of this means that though we may have a unique and imperative sense 
of duty, it need not be "categorical." In  other words, duty (conscience, the 
moral sense) may imperatively say, "This is right," without necessarily saying, 
"You must do the right only because it is right." The moral sense gives to us 
a peculiar, unique tone of feeling, and one might argue that obedience to the 
moral sense gives us our only distinctively moral reason for doing right. But 
we might well know that something was good or  bad apart from the moral 
sense if by chance we had discovered an adequate definition of the good. Apart 
from the moral sense, however, we could never experience the feelings ofguilt, 
injustice, or obligation. Presumably, however, our definition should largely 
correspond to our moral feelings. If our definition involved human advantage, 
in some broad sense, our duty would not necessarily be found incompatible 
with that advantage. Our  felt duty may very well be pointing the way to our 
enhanced welfare, however that word is understood. Duty could even be 
pointlng us toward the maximum of pleasure; but if we are not hedonists, we 
may replace pleasure w ~ t h  whatever end we decide upon, whether satisfaction- 
fulfillment, love, obedience to God, self-actualization, the fulfillment of our 
rational nature, or  whatever. The point is that an intuitionist urges that we do 
in fact have an imperative sense of duty, but he does not necessarily have to 
say that we must obey duty only for duty's sake. I t  is not completely clear, 
in fact, what meaning that latter phrase is supposed to have. 
I suspect that some philosophers feel that the positing of a moral faculty is 
too ad hoe or perhaps even too occult for respectability. But an ethical intui- 
tion is not so  implausible or  extraordinary as it might seem. There is nothing 
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more mysterious in some situations giving rise in us to a sense of injustice than 
in photons giving rise in us to a sensation of light. Or  rather, if you like, both 
of these things are highly and equally mysterious. 
People used to speak of the "five senses," but we know that this is a great 
oversimplification. Actually, the body yields many different sorts of feelings to 
consciousness. Besides sight (light and color), sound, smell, tastes (four sepa- 
rate ones), temperature, pressure, and texture, there are many other distinctive 
sensory experiences, including pain, lust, hunger, fullness, aching, itching, 
suffocation, sleepiness, etc. Likewise for man's emotional and psychological 
nature: Man experiences many quite distinct kinds of psychological states, 
including happiness (several different kinds), sadness (several different kinds), 
foreboding, meIancholy, fear, loneliness, curiosity, frustration, anger, compas- 
sion, esthetic rapture, etc. Philosophers tend to concentrate on man's cognitive 
and conative nature when discussing the psyche. But man's affective nature is 
of great importance. Man's feeling nature is highly complex and multifaceted. 
There is no logical or scientific necessity to deny that the senses of guilt, 
injustice, or obligation are feelings just as distinct as are those of suffocation 
or boredom. Most babies draw back from high pIaces, and react with fear to 
loud noises; adults feel an innate attraction toward sweet foods and an innate 
repulsion toward extremely bitter o r  sour foods.12 Animals are guided by a 
thousand innate attractions and repulsions, which serve various purposes in 
the life of the animal or of his species. Amidst this great welter of different 
kinds of feelings and different kinds of attractions and repulsions, there is no 
reason to be surprised if man has peculiarly ethical feelings. 
I believe it would help the intuitionist's case if he would recognize that moral 
feelings are probably more comparable to certain emotions than they are to 
our senses. I mean by this that we do not see an injustice in the way that we 
see a lion. Our feeling of injustice is stimulated by inferred elements in situa- 
tions, often by what we infer to be the intentions behind people's behavior. 
Similarly, we do not see the fearsomeness of a lion; whether o r  not we fear the 
lion depends upon inferred elements in the situation-e.g., whether we have 
reason to belleve he is tame, toothless, full, decrepit, paralyzed, etc. 
To say that moral feelings are more like emotions than like senses may seem 
to invite us down the road toward some variety of "emotivism" in ethics. But 
I do not mean to indicate sympathy with that doctrine. To speak merely of 
"pro" o r  "con" attitudes toward situations is to fail to note the unique tone 
of feeling involved in moral disapproval. Hunger and lust are two sorts of 
"pro" attitudes, but they are totally different in felt quality from each other 
and from other sorts of desires. Fear of high places, repugnance at food when 
full, annoyance at being waked up, are all "con" attitudes, but likewise each 
of these is distinct in its quality. The intuitionist holds that the repugnance we 
feel toward certain kinds of acts or ~ntentions is also unique in quality, with 
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an innate base in human nature, and moreover with a certain direction or bias 
as to the kinds of things which stimulate it. 
The most plausible attempted reductions of the moral faculty are to feelings 
of sympathy or of fear of punishment. Those who deny the uniqueness of the 
moral sense usually believe that it is nothing but a variation of the emotions 
of fear or of sympathy. But examples of wrongdoing could be adduced where 
no fear of punishment could be involved and where no sympathetic response 
to the sufferings of others is involved. (Consenting incest with one's daughter, 
for example.) But in any case, introspection reveals that obligation and guilt 
have a qualitatively different tone from any other experience. 
You can shuffle "I want" and "I am forced" and "I shall be well advrsed" and "I dare not" 
as long as you please wrthout gettrrig out of them the slrghtest hlnt of "ought" and "ought 
tiot " And, once agaln, attempts to resolve the moral experrence Into someth~ng else always 
presuppose the very thlng they are tryrng to explarn-as when a famous psychoanalyst 
deduces ~t from preh~stor~c parrlc~de. If the parrlc~de produced a sense of gullt, that was 
because nien felt that they ought not to have commrtted ~ t .  rf they d ~ d  not so feel, rt could 
produce no sense of gurlt.lJ 
Could people be trained to have a kind of feeling, a tone of experience, for 
which they had no innate capacity? Could people be trained to feel guilty if 
there were no physiological basis for such a feeling? This seems highly doubt- 
ful. People have no innate capacity for feeling magnetic lines of force, and 
although people could be trained to  avoid magnets, o r  what they believed to  
be magnets, they could never be trained to feel the force fields surrounding 
magnets. And if they could, that would only prove that people had an innate 
sensitivity of a unique kind which had hitherto remained unstimulated. Like- 
wise, people could be taught to pursue food after a period of going without it, 
or they could be taught to avoid it after eating a certain amount, but they never 
could be taught actually to feel hunger or satiation if they had no natural 
physiological basis for such feelings. Similarly, the intuitionist doubts that 
people could be trained to feel guilty, though they could be trained to act as 
$they felt guilty. Of course people could be taught to fear committing acts 
against society. But could they be taught to feel guilty over doing so? A subtle 
question, no doubt; but in this matter the intuitionist has a respectably strong 
position, from which he is not likely to be dislodged by a priori arguments. 
Finally, I might mention one little-remarked fact which is of some interest. 
If we are indeed possessed of a moral intuition, obedience to it would be in 
accord with our nature and hence itself satisfying and fulfilling. In that case, 
not only would the conscience be guiding us toward fulfilling and satisfying 
courses of action (reverting here again to Taylor and Blanshard), but also the 
very act of obedience would be satisfying. J. S. Mill speaks of virtue as being 
not onIy conducive to happiness, but also something we may come to love in 
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itself, so that virtuous action, in his view, not only would lead to happiness, 
but could be pleasant in itself. And even Kant thinks that obedience to con- 
science satisfies a highly peculiar, "self-wrought" motive, namely, respect for 
law. Certainly the conscience, if present, is as much a part of our nature as 
anything else, and, like other parts of our nature, will frustrate us if not met 
on appropriate terms, and will yield its own kind of satisfaction if so met. 
Virtue is thus its own reward, even if there were no others. 
This is comparable to saying that not only is pleasant tasting food good for 
the body in general, but it is also good for the tongue and the stomach 
themselves. 
In summary we have the following questions and problems: 
(1) D o  we have a unique and irreducible moral sensitivity? 
(2) Are moral feelings universaI? (See note 3.) 
(3) Could an intuition be a source of warranted belief, at  least in principle? 
(4) Could an intuition be mistaken in principle? 
( 5 )  Is intuition merely the same as  a strong belief? 
(6) Could an ethical intuition be verified or  cross-checked in a manner 
comparable to our other senses? Are there tests for moral blindness? 
(7) Is the good necessarily defined by the moral sensitivity, felt in an irre- 
ducible and unanalyzable manner, or rather could it merely be indicated 
by the sensitivity? 
(8) What is our ethical intuition telling us? Can we generalize from our 
experience to a few principles? 
I have not here discussed the second and eighth points, but I include them 
by way of making a more complete list of the important questions on the issue 
of intuitionism. 
Of all these points, the seventh one seems to me a crucial one. For if we 
relieve the moral intuition of the burden of having to carry our whole knowl- 
edge of the good, if we merely let it point to the good, we can then feel free 
to ~nvestigate the nature of that good, without prejudice to whether it must 
consist of natural or  nonnatural properties or whether it can be reduced to one 
or a few general items, and ~f so which ones, and so forth. If we do not oblige 
ourselves to define the good by our intuition, we are then free to cross-check 
the intuition against whatever definition of the good we finally settle on. In  
short, intuitionism is compatible with a whole range of ethical theories, and 
is by no means a dead option for ethical theorists. 
When we consider the severe difficulties philosophers face when they at- 
tempt to say what knowledge is in general and how we may achieve it, when 
we consider the problems faced by the philosophers of science and of mathe- 
matics, when we consider that even knowledge derived from "direct" sense 
experience is problematic in important respects, it is no wonder that the 
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doctrine of ethical intuitionism should strike many thinkers as many times 
more difficult to justify than ordinary scientific empiricism. In the face of this 
difficulty, why does anyone try to do it? Why should anyone undertake to 
support so difficult a proposition as that men may actually have real knowledge 
of values, and moreover that they have this knowledge by virtue of "just 
seeing" it? Truly it is easy to sympathize with those who deny an ethical 
intuition. 
But in any ordinary use of the word, we simply know that wanton infliction 
of suffering is bad. We know we have moral obligations. If it turns out to be 
extremely difficult to justify this knowledge, it is yet more difficult to deny that 
we have it. Even if we justified our ethical knowledge to everyone's satisfaction, 
we would still have to justify the process we used in the justification of it. The 
skeptic has no end of questions, and it may be that somewhere down the line, 
no matter how far back we go, we shall finally reach a point where no further 
justification is possible and we shall have to say simply that we "just see" or 
"just feel" something to be so. Perhaps in the case of ethical knowledge, we 
are already at that irreducible end-point just as soon as we "see" our duty (or 
the obligatory or the good). C. S. Peirce had something like this in mind when 
he congratulated the medieval philosophers for having the good judgment not 
to question first principles.'" 
Well, the intuitionist may be mistaken; all present schools of ethical theory 
may be mistaken, but our powerful moral experience will never permit most 
thoughtful persons to lapse into mere skepticism. And if the arguments usually 
adduced in favor of ethical intuitionism are not such as to win everyone over, 
neither are the arguments for the validity of scientific induction. The intuition- 
ist has done all that can reasonably be expected of him if he can show that 
ethical intuition is possible in principle and that a fair number of important 
considerations conspire to lend some plausibility to his view. To hope at this 
stage for much more, on a topic of such notorious difficulty, seems to me 
excessive; but likewise, to criticize the intuitionist for not having more than 
this is probably too severe. 
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